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Abstract: I describe a model of competition law enforcement that treats competition and 
innovation policy as the inseparable partners they ought to be.  The enforcement authority 
determines an optimal punishment knowing that if it sets the penalty too high it will 
reduce firms’ incentives to invest in innovation, and if firms do not invest, new goods and 
new markets will not be created.  The authority therefore moderates the penalty in order 
to maintain innovation incentives.  The implications of this framework for competition 
policy and for innovation policy are quite different from what is commonly observed 
today.  I discuss implications for competition law enforcement, standard essential patents, 
and the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Competition policy and innovation policy are developed and applied within separate 
spheres in most legal systems.  In the U.S., one executive branch department and one 
federal agency – the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade 
Commission – enforce the federal antitrust laws.  Another federal agency, the Patent and 
Trademark Office, grants patents and registers trademarks.  No one suggests that these 
agencies should adopt a common regulatory policy. 
 
However, competition and innovation policies are inextricably intertwined.  The 
prominent U.S. government antitrust cases of recent years have been brought against 
innovative firms in the technology industry – Microsoft, Google, Apple, to name just a 
few of them.  Over the history of antitrust enforcement, firms that have gained market 
power through innovation have often been the targets of antitrust litigation. Defendants in 
the most important antitrust cases shaping monopolization law – Standard Oil, United 
States Steel, and Alcoa – became dominant primarily through innovation in technology 
and business methods. 
 
A common theory of innovation, dating to Schumpeter, is that it creates temporary 
monopoly power, enabling the innovator to earn a supra-competitive profit, as a rent on 
innovation, until competitors copy the innovation and drive profits back down to the 
long-run competitive equilibrium level.  The potential for a temporary monopoly spurs 
innovation.  Innovation leads to monopoly.  Monopoly leads to entry.  Entry restores 
competitive pricing.  To the extent that this theory explains a great deal of innovation 
observed in competitive markets, it implies that the same set of economic concerns 
should drive both the regulation of competition and the regulation of innovation. 
 
In this paper I describe a model of competition law enforcement that treats competition 
and innovation policy as the inseparable partners they ought to be.  The enforcement 
authority determines an optimal punishment knowing that if it sets the penalty too high it 
will reduce firms’ incentives to invest in innovation, and if firms do not invest, new 
goods and new markets will not be created.  The authority therefore moderates the 
penalty in order to maintain investment incentives.  This is distinguishable from the 
efficiency-based analysis associated with the Chicago School of antitrust.  Efficiency, in 
the sense of reducing supply-side costs or enhancing demand-side value to consumers, 
has been accepted by antitrust courts and enforcement agencies since the Chicago 
revolution as a reason for moderating antitrust penalties.  Innovation, by contrast, remains 
a topic that is viewed as too speculative within the enforcement agencies to serve as a 
justification for moderating penalties.1 
                                                 
1 Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions, 78 
Antitrust Law Journal 1 (2012).  The extent to which innovation concerns should influence antitrust 
enforcement policy is a long-standing issue.  See Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How 
Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 Antitrust Law Journal 1 (2007); JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, 
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1942); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of 
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
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The implications of this framework for competition policy and for innovation policy are 
quite different from what is commonly observed today.  Optimal antitrust enforcement of 
monopolization law is more lenient when dynamic competition – primarily the 
innovation incentive – is taken into account.  The optimal penalty is less than the level 
that internalizes consumer harm, the efficient penalty under the Chicago School model.  
Indeed, under certain conditions, subsidization of the monopolist is an optimal policy.  As 
for innovation policy, one possible response to a patent application is granting the patent 
and giving the patentee a monetary prize as well. 
 
In some respects, this model turns modern competition policy, which emphasizes the 
short run welfare of consumers, on its head.  Under the model’s prescriptions, 
enforcement authorities should give considerably more attention to innovation concerns 
than they do now.  Much of current antitrust enforcement, in the U.S. and in the EU, 
adopts policies that are inconsistent with the recommendations of this framework.2 
 
Part II presents two models of antitrust enforcement.  The first, which I refer to as the 
static enforcement model, is the now-standard efficiency theory of antitrust enforcement.  
Under the static model, antitrust enforcement should aim to internalize consumer harm.  
In the second model, which incorporates innovation, the internalization policy is 
observed to be too punitive, and reduces overall welfare relative to a more lenient policy.  
The relative leniency results because punishment must be constrained in order to 
maintain innovation incentives. 
 
In Part III, I discuss some implications for modern antitrust policy, as exemplified by the 
Supreme Court’s FTC v. Actavis decision and recent enforcement policies in the U.S. and 
the EU.  Modern antitrust policy is in many respects misguided, from the perspective of 
this paper’s framework.  The innovation implications of antitrust enforcement receive 
little consideration in Actavis, and current enforcement policies on matters such as patent 
infringement litigation reflect the same failure. 
  
II. Models of Antitrust Enforcement 
 
In this part I describe two models of antitrust enforcement.  The first, the static model, 
considers the tradeoff between consumer harm and productive efficiency.  The key 
source for the static model is Becker’s theory of law enforcement, which as a byproduct 
provides a formal version of the Chicago model of antitrust enforcement.  The Becker 
theory recommends a shift away from an enforcement policy that seeks to eliminate any 
prospect of gain to the offender, the dominant punishment policy from the time of 
                                                                                                                                                 
FACTORS 609 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962).  Innovation is treated as a basis for enhancing antitrust 
enforcement in the most recent horizontal merger guidelines, see Keith N. Hylton, Brown Shoe Versus the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 Review of Industrial Organization 95 (2011). 
2 I am referring to enforcement policy.  Not all of antitrust law is opposed to this framework.  Indeed, 
David Evans and I have argued that the dynamic enforcement model provides a positive theory of Section 2 
doctrine, which is otherwise puzzlingly lenient.  David S. Evans and Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful 
Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, 4 
Competition Policy International 203 (2008). 
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Bentham, toward an enforcement policy of internalizing the social harm caused by the 
offender’s conduct.  In the antitrust setting, this implies that the consumer harm should be 
internalized to the monopolizing firm. 
 
The second model, the dynamic model, offers a simple method of incorporating 
innovation into the enforcement theory.  When innovation is incorporated, the 
internalization policy of Becker is excessively punitive.  The optimal antitrust penalty in 
the dynamic model is unambiguously less than the internalizing penalty. 
 
The dynamic competition view of antitrust enforcement has been in existence for a long 
time, and can be dated to Schumpeter.3  Still, there has been little effort to incorporate 
innovation concerns into models of antitrust enforcement. The dynamic framework 
described here was initially described informally by Evans and Hylton,4 and formalized 
in an article by Hylton and Lin.5 
 
A. Static Antitrust Enforcement Model 
 
The firm has a choice over whether to take a “monopolizing act.”  The act could be a 
decision to enter into an exclusivity contract, or to tie one product to another.  The 
monopolizing act allows the firm to increase its price, leading to a transfer (T in Figure 1) 
of consumer surplus to the firm.  The price increase also leads a reduction in output 
below the competitive level and an associated loss in consumer welfare (D), which I will 
also refer to as “deadweight loss.”  After the monopolizing act, consumers are left with 
the residual surplus W. 
 
The firm’s monopolizing act may have efficiency consequences.  For example, an 
exclusive dealing contract with a key input supplier could have a monopolizing effect by 
excluding rival firms from access to the supplier, but it could also enhance efficiency by 
reducing supply costs.  The efficiency gain, shown in Figure 1 by E, is realized in the 
form of a reduction of average cost from c0 to c1.  The new cost curve c1 is shown with a 
dotted line because I am assuming that the efficiency gain is a random event that may or 
may not materialize. 
                                                 
3 SCHUMPETER, supra note 1. 
4 Evans & Hylton, supra note 2. 
5 Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Innovation and Optimal Punishment, with Antitrust Applications, 
forthcoming Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2013, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1305147 
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Figure 1: Welfare consequences of monopolizing act that also reduces costs.
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The efficiency gain could be greater than the deadweight loss (E > D).  If so, then the 
firm’s monopolizing act would enhance social welfare. 
 
Under these assumptions, the efficient enforcement policy internalizes to the 
monopolizing firm the social costs of its conduct.6  Under the internalization approach, 
the firm would choose to take a monopolizing act when and only when the gain to the 
firm exceeds the loss to consumers.  Efficient conduct would not be prohibited.  The 
internalization rule generates a simple recommendation for the optimal monetary penalty: 
if enforcement is perfect and costless, the penalty should be set equal to the sum of the 
transfer from consumers and the foregone consumer surplus (T+D). 
 
If the enforcement authority is unlikely to detect and bring an enforcement action in 
every instance of a monopolizing act, the optimal penalty will include a multiplier.  In 
addition, if enforcement is costly, the enforcement cost should be internalized to the 
firm.7  If the probability of enforcement is P, and the enforcement cost is C, the optimal 
antitrust penalty is then8 
 
Static Penalty = T D C
P
     
 
I refer to this as the optimal static penalty because my description of the enforcement 
problem does not incorporate any consideration of the innovation effects of antitrust 
enforcement. 
 
This model is for the most part suggestive because it treats enforcement as an exclusively 
public sector activity.  When private enforcement actions are modeled, one finds a link 
between the probability of a private action and the profitability of a lawsuit.9  If the 
multiplier is set at a level that induces all victims to bring suit, the probability of an 
enforcement action will be 100 percent.  But once the probability of a private 
enforcement action reaches 100 percent, there will no longer be a need to multiply 
                                                 
6 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).  
Internalization results in “first-best” deterrence – in the sense that the monopolization decision will be 
made when and only when it increases social welfare.  I am equating first-best deterrence with optimal 
deterrence, but the two can be distinguished in some settings.  For example, if enforcement agents have 
discretion over whether to bring an action in court or in an administrative proceeding, an optimal 
enforcement regime might discourage costly types of litigation or weak claims.  For a discussion of first 
best and optimal deterrence in the private enforcement setting, see Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, 
Should Tort Damages be Multiplied?, 21  J.L. Econ. &. Org. 388, 410 (2005). 
7 The assumption that enforcement is a natural byproduct of an offense simplifies matters, but it not 
necessarily valid.  Suppose the enforcement agency decides each case by comparing the gain from 
enforcement to its cost.  In this case, an optimal scheme might shift the enforcement cost to the agency in 
order to generate efficient enforcement decisions. 
8 See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. Chicago L. Rev. 652 (1983); 
KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 43-52 (2003). 
9 Hylton & Miceli, supra note 5. 
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damages.  It follows that the optimal multiplier for private lawsuits efficiently balances 
the supply of lawsuits with the number required by the optimal deterrence goal.10 
  
B. Dynamic Antitrust Enforcement Model 
 
In this part I describe an innovation-sensitive enforcement model.  Return to Figure 1, 
and suppose there are two time periods.  In the first, the firm decides whether to invest in 
an activity that generates the market.  In the second, the firm decides whether to take the 
monopolizing act. 
 
For example, suppose the firm designs and produces a new, superior type of artificial 
tooth in the first period.11  The firm cannot get a patent on the design and the tooth is 
easily replicable.  Facing the risk of immediate competition from firms that copy its 
design, the firm may choose to take an action that excludes rivals for some period of time 
necessary to recoup investment costs.  For example, the firm might enter into exclusivity 
contracts with the most important downstream sellers of dental products. 
 
In this dynamic story, some of the surplus from innovation is transferred to the firm (T ) 
and some surplus is destroyed (D), but the firm’s conduct also rewards consumers with 
the residual surplus that remains after the monopolizing conduct (W ).  If not for the 
firm’s first-period investment, which was undertaken because of anticipation of profits 
generated from second-period exclusionary conduct, consumers would never have 
received the residual surplus. 
 
The optimal antitrust penalty has to be designed to reconcile conflicting welfare 
concerns.  There is the static welfare concern addressed earlier: the monopolizing firm 
should be forced regurgitate the transfer and to pay for the destroyed surplus in order to 
optimally regulate its incentive to monopolize.  However, the penalty will also affect 
investment incentives.  In order to optimally regulate investment incentives in isolation, 
the ideal penalty would be negative, a subsidy equal to the residual surplus.  The private 
benefit of the firm’s investment is simply the transfer T; the social benefit is the sum of 
the transfer and residual surplus T+W.  In order to align private incentives to invest with 
social incentives, the firm should be awarded a bounty equal to the residual surplus.12 
 
To find the optimal penalty, let’s consider the objective function that a social planner 
would maximize.  Although the expression for the objective function is set out in the 
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 This example, based on United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), is taken from 
David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power and Its 
Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, 4 Competition Policy International 203 (2008).  
12 I assume that the monopolizing firm cannot engage in price discrimination.  If the firm implements 
perfect price discrimination in the monopolization stage, charging each consumer the maximum that he is 
willing to pay, there will be no economic basis for imposing a penalty, or for providing a subsidy.  The 
perfectly discriminating monopolist will not destroy any surplus; and, given this, there will be no need to 
impose the static penalty in order to regulate the monopolization incentive.  And since the perfectly 
discriminating monopolist will not externalize any surplus that it generates from innovation to consumers, 
there will be no need to provide a subsidy in order to optimally regulate the investment incentive. 
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margins, I will try to explain it in the text with sufficient intuition to make the footnoted 
material unnecessary to follow the argument. 
 
From Figure 1, the gain to the firm from monopolization is the sum of the transfer and the 
efficiency gain T+E, because the monopolizing act generates both a wealth transfer from 
consumers and an efficiency gain at the same time.  To simplify, let M represent this total 
gain (M = T+E).  Since the efficiency gain is a random variable in this model, so is M.  
Since the firm will monopolize whenever its total gain is greater than the expected 
penalty PF, the probability that monopolization will occur is just the probability that M > 
PF, and the probability that monopolization will not occur is the probability that M < 
PF.13 
 
The firm will invest before knowing the value of the total gain M that will be realized.  
After all, if the efficiency gain results from a cost reduction due to a new technology, the 
innovating firm will not know how great its total gain is until the technology is in place.  
The firm will invest if the expected gain from monopolization, net of the penalty, is 
greater than the investment cost.  If the investment cost is a random variable, then there is 
a cutoff cost level, which is equal to the expected return from monopolization, above 
which the firm will not invest and below which the firm will invest.  The probability that 
the firm will invest is then the probability that the cost of investment is below the cutoff 
value.14  
 
The objective of the enforcement authority is to choose the optimal fine to maximize the 
net benefit to society.  The net benefit consists of several components.  First, there is the 
benefit that is internal to the business enterprise.  That benefit is simply the expected 
profit from investment – the difference between the expected gain from monopolization 
and the cost of investment given that the firm chooses to invest.  The expected penalty is 
not subtracted off the expected profit because the penalty is simply a transfer of resources 
within society.15   
 
Second, the enforcement authority would consider the gain to consumers if the firm 
decides to invest and to monopolize, which is the residual surplus that remains after 
monopolization.  However, given that the firm monopolizes and society will therefore 
bear an expected enforcement cost, the net gain to society, under this set of events, is the 
residual surplus to consumers less the expected enforcement cost.16  Raising the fine for 
monopolization reduces this gain to society as long as the residual surplus is greater than 
                                                 
13 Assume M is governed by the probability distribution H(M).  Since the expected fine is equal to the 
probability of enforcement multiplied by the fine, PF, the firm will monopolize whenever M > PF.  Since 
the probability that the firm will not monopolize because M < PF is given by H(PF), the probability that 
the firm will monopolize is 1 – H(PF). 
14 Let the investment cost, ko, be governed by the probability distribution  with corresponding density.  
The potential offender invests when ok < ok  = (1–H(PF))[E(M | M > PF) – PF], and the probability of 
investment is ( )oΨ k . 
15 In technical terms, ( )oΨ k {[(1–H(PF))E(M |M>PF) – E( ok | ok < ok )]. 
16 In technical terms, this component of the authority’s objective function is ( )oΨ k (1–H(PF))(W– PC) . 
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the cost of enforcing the law.  If the residual surplus is less than the expected cost of 
enforcement, then consumers do not gain anything when the firm monopolizes – in other 
words, the game is not worth the candle from the perspective of the consumer. This 
implies that the authority should be willing to raise the fine higher when innovation offers 
little in the form of residual surplus to consumers.  The reason is to discourage 
monopolization, thereby preserving more of the potential innovation surplus for society. 
 
Third, the enforcement authority would consider the benefit to society if the firm invests 
and then chooses not to monopolize after observing its total gain M in relation to the 
expected penalty.17  This is a possible outcome because the firm invests without knowing 
its total gain, and then observes its total gain after investment, and after that decides 
whether to monopolize.  Thus, a firm may invest, and then choose not to monopolize 
because the realized gain is too low relative to the expected penalty for monopolization. 
 
The third outcome is the ideal one for the enforcement authority, because it entails 
society getting the innovation surplus and the allocatively efficient outcome ex post.  One 
way the authority could secure this result is to promise not to punish the firm before it 
invests, and then surprise the firm by imposing an extremely harsh punishment after it 
invests.  However, such an approach would work only once.  Firms would wise up and 
refuse to invest in the future after one firm was snookered in such a fashion by the 
enforcement agency.  The authority has to commit to an enforcement policy. 
 
The optimal penalty maximizes the enforcement authority’s objective function, which 
consists of the three components just mentioned.18  The optimal antitrust penalty in the 
dynamic setting is of the form 
 
         Dynamic Penalty = (1– )(Static Penalty) +  (Innovation Subsidy), 
 
where Static Penalty = (T+D)/P+C, Innovation Subsidy = -W/P +C, and the subsidy 
weight 0 <  ≤ 1.19  The optimal dynamic penalty is a weighted average of the static 
penalty and the optimal innovation subsidy.  Moreover, since the subsidy weight is 
positive, the optimal dynamic penalty is unambiguously less than the static (internalizing) 
penalty of the Chicago enforcement model. 
 
                                                 
17  ( )oΨ k H(PF)S, where S = T+D+W. 
18 Putting all of the components described so far together, the authority’s objective function is 
NB = ( )oΨ k {[(1–H(PF))E(M |M>PF) – E( ok | ok < ok )] + (1–H(PF))(W– PC) + H(PF)S}.  
19 Letting F represent the fine, a more precise description of the optimal penalty is as follows: 
              * 1 T D WF C
P P
                ,      
where  is a discontinuous function of F with the properties  > 0;   = 1 for F* ≤ 0; and (F*) > 0 for F* > 
0.  See Hylton & Lin, supra note 5. 
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The subsidy weight θ, itself an increasing function of the penalty, varies with the relative 
responsiveness of the firm’s monopolization and investment incentives to changes in the 
penalty.  If a change in the penalty would have no effect on ex ante investment, while 
discouraging the monopolizing act, the subsidy weight will be close to zero, and the 
dynamic penalty will be roughly the same as the static penalty.  This might be observed if 
the firm’s discount rate is so high that a change in the penalty has little effect on ex ante 
investment incentives.  If the change in the penalty has a big impact on ex ante 
investment, the subsidy weight will be close to one, and the optimal penalty is likely to be 
negative – specifically, a subsidy based on the residual consumer surplus. 
 
Overall, the sign and size of the optimal antitrust penalty depend on several factors.  If 
the expected enforcement cost is greater than the residual surplus (PC > W), then the 
optimal penalty is always positive, for reasons given earlier.  This is the case in which the 
administrative cost of enforcement is larger than the residual surplus from innovation – 
the residual value to consumers of the innovation is too small to justify the administrative 
costs of the assessment process.  The penalty in this case is never as large as the static 
penalty.  Its size is determined by that of the subsidy weight, which itself is determined 
by the relative elasticities of investment and monopolization with respect to the penalty.  
As the elasticity of monopolization increases relative to the elasticity of innovation, the 
optimal penalty approaches the static penalty. 
 
If the expected enforcement cost is less than the residual surplus (PC < W), the optimal 
dynamic penalty could be a penalty or a subsidy depending on the elasticities that 
determine the subsidy weight.  If the elasticity of innovation is greater at every penalty 
level than the elasticity of monopolization, the optimal subsidy weight will be equal to 
one, and the optimal penalty will be negative.  If the elasticity of innovation is not greater 
than the elasticity of monopolization, the optimal penalty will be positive. 
 
The regulatory program suggested by this analysis, then, looks roughly as follows.  If the 
expected enforcement cost exceeds the residual surplus, the penalty is positive but not as 
high as the static penalty.  There is no need to subsidize, in this case, because there is no 
benefit externalized by the innovation – the entire benefit from innovation is enjoyed by 
the firm.  Still, since there is a benefit from innovation, the optimal policy is lenient 
relative to the static enforcement policy. 
 
If the expected enforcement cost is less than the residual surplus, then there is an external 
benefit resulting from innovation, even after monopolization.  The decision to penalize or 
to subsidize depends on the comparative sensitivities of investment and monopolization 
to changes in the penalty.  If investment is more sensitive to the penalty than is 
monopolization, then a subsidy is the solution.  If monopolization is more sensitive than 
investment, penalization is optimal.  The reason is intuitive.  The authority wants to 
enhance society’s wealth as much as possible at the lowest cost in terms of diminished 
investment.  If investment is very sensitive, then the authority will have to subsidize.  If 
monopolization is the most sensitive, then the authority can maintain investment while 
discouraging monopolization. 
  
10 
 
Although the pure innovation subsidy, -W/P + C, is a potentially optimal policy given the 
right set of parameter values (residual surplus greater than expected enforcement cost, 
elasticity of investment greater than elasticity of monopolization), the penalty that 
internalizes consumer harm, (T+D)/P, is never an optimal policy in the dynamic setting.  
The dynamic enforcement model puts a greater emphasis on internalizing the residual 
surplus from innovation than on internalizing the consumer harm. 
 
The asymmetric treatment of the innovation benefit and the consumer harm is a reflection 
of the relative importance of innovation to social welfare.  Innovation is necessary in 
order for any consumer benefit to be realized.  The model therefore implies that the 
optimal penalty should be constrained in order to maintain the innovation incentive. 
 
III. Patent Policy 
 
I have emphasized the antitrust application of this model, but it applies equally well to 
intellectual property.  The model suggests a process that the enforcement authority should 
implement for the issuance of patents. 
 
Instead of assuming that the firm takes some exclusionary act after investment, assume 
now that the firm approaches the enforcement authority to ask for a patent.  In this story, 
the firm invests, and then approaches the enforcement authority.  The enforcement 
authority charges a fee, or perhaps awards a subsidy (negative fee).  The probability of 
enforcement can remain in the model, on the assumption that there is a chance (1-P) that 
the authority will simply grant the patent without charging a fee. 
 
If the residual surplus to consumers W is less than the expected administrative cost PC 
(i.e., game is not worth the candle from the consumer’s perspective), the enforcement 
authority will charge a positive fee for the patent.  The fee is designed to reduce the 
likelihood that the firm will choose to pursue the patent.   In other words, the scenario 
envisioned under this sequence of events is as follows: (1) the firm invests in innovation; 
(2) after investing, the firm approaches the authority to seek a patent, disclosing its 
innovation (if necessary for replication); (3) the authority states a fee for the patent; and 
(4) the firm, after comparing the fee to the return from the patent, decides whether to 
pursue the patent.  If the firm decides not to pursue the patent, it will face immediate 
competition because its disclosure precludes a trade secret strategy. 
 
If the residual surplus exceeds the expected administrative cost, then the authority may 
give a monetary award or impose a fee, depending on the comparative elasticities of 
investment and monopolization with respect to the penalty.  Thus, in this scenario: (1) the 
firm invests in innovation; (2) after investing, the firm seeks a patent (and discloses), (3) 
the authority offers a monetary award with the patent, an award that internalizes the 
residual surplus of consumers; and (4) the firm accepts the patent and the award. 
 
IV. Observations and Implications 
 
11 
 
This is a good point at which to compare the implications of the static and dynamic 
enforcement models.  In antitrust enforcement, the dynamic model is obviously lenient 
relative to the static model.  The static policy requires the imposition of a penalty that 
internalizes consumer harm.  The dynamic model imposes a penalty that falls short of 
internalizing consumer harm – because it is a weighted average of the penalty that 
internalizes consumer harm and an innovation subsidy.  Moreover, under some 
conditions, the dynamic model provides an award or subsidy to the monopolizing firm 
rather than a penalty.  The possibility of subsidizing a monopolizing firm is a regulatory 
option that has not been considered by any antitrust enforcement authority. 
 
In innovation policy, the standard approaches have considered patents and prizes as 
alternatives.20  In this model, one regulatory option is to award a patent and a prize to the 
firm.  Again, this is a regulatory option that does not appear to have been adopted in any 
intellectual property regime. 
 
Where are subsidies or prizes most likely to be efficient?  This model implies that there 
are two areas of inquiry in determining the efficiency of a prize to the monopolizing firm.  
The first is whether the residual surplus to consumers – that is, the consumer surplus that 
remains after the firm has monopolized – is greater than the average administrative cost 
of enforcing the law.  If the residual surplus is less than the average administrative cost, 
then the authority should impose a penalty, never a prize.  The simple reason is that 
monopolization offers relatively little to consumers, even though it enhances the profits 
of the firm, so the authority should discourage it more aggressively than in the case where 
the innovation benefits consumers even after administrative costs are taken into account. 
 
If the residual surplus is high, the second line of inquiry is an examination of the relative 
sensitivities of investment and monopolization to the size of the penalty.  If raising the 
penalty harms investment incentives greatly, while having a comparatively mild effect on 
the monopolization incentive, then a subsidy may be efficient.  The reason is that it is 
better to have the innovation, even if it comes with a monopoly, than to not have it at all.  
Conversely, if the monopolization elasticity is much greater than the investment 
elasticity, then a penalty is likely to be optimal, because the penalty will not dampen 
investment incentives much but will dampen the likelihood of monopolization. 
 
Putting these observations together suggests that subsidization is likely to be the optimal 
response when the firm’s innovation is especially valuable to the consumer – for 
example, in the pharmaceutical or medical device industries.  For potentially life-saving 
products, consumers are likely to be willing to pay considerably more than the monopoly 
price for the product, which means that the residual surplus after monopolization is likely 
to be high.  The other consideration is the sensitivity of investment to the penalty, which 
is equivalent to considering the sensitivity of investment to the firm’s profits.  Research 
and development expenditure appears to be quite sensitive to cash flow in the 
                                                 
20 Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J. Law & Econ. 
525 (2001); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research 
Contracts, 73 American Economic Review 691 (1983). 
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pharmaceutical industry.21  These observations suggest the pharmaceutical industry as a 
candidate for the subsidization policy. 
 
The current direction of antitrust and innovation policy appears to be directly opposed to 
the sort of protection or accommodation of innovation incentives suggested in this 
framework.  Much antitrust litigation is directed toward the technology, healthcare, 
medical drug, and medical device industries – all areas of intense innovative activity.  
Patents are increasingly challenged, indirectly, on antitrust grounds.  Based on news 
accounts, actors in the medical and high technology sectors seem to face an ever-
increasing risk of antitrust litigation, from consumers and from the government.  Much 
modern scholarship questions the value of protecting innovation profits relative to the 
value of increasing access to drugs and technological innovations.22  The increasing 
burden of antitrust litigation and regulatory expropriation probably has worked to 
dampen incentives to innovate. 
 
One example is the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,23 a pharmaceutical 
patent infringement case.  The Court held that the rule of reason test applies to reverse 
payment settlements, overturning the scope-of-patent test adopted by most courts.24  
Under the scope-of-patent test, an agreement to settle a patent infringement dispute 
would be upheld if the terms of the agreement were within the scope of the challenged 
patent.  For example, if a patent holder and an alleged infringer settled a dispute by 
forming an agreement in which the alleged infringer would not attempt to enter the 
market until several years after the expiration of the patent, such an agreement would 
violate the scope-of-patent test.  However, if the settlement granted no more protection 
from competition to the patent holder than was already promised by the patent, then the 
agreement would not violate the antitrust laws. 
 
It is not immediately clear that the rule of reason test will ultimately result in a 
substantially greater risk of antitrust liability to patent holders than the scope-of-patent 
test.  A carefully executed rule-of-reason evaluation of a patent settlement involves an 
analysis of several complicated issues,25 and it is unclear how they will be resolved at this 
stage.  Over time, courts may develop rules that make it difficult for parties to bring 
successful antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements of patent infringement 
disputes.  The rules may make success under the rule of reason test just as difficult as 
under the scope-of-patent rule, and in this case potential complainants will be reluctant to 
file antitrust challenges to patent infringement dispute settlements.  But in the short run, 
                                                 
21 See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, edited by 
Patricia M. Danzon & Sean Nicholson, 59-60 (Chapter 3 by Sean Nicholson, Financing Research and 
Development, pages 47-74). 
22 See generally, RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE 
WORLD OF IDEAS (2013).  
23 570 U.S. _ (2013). 
24 On the scope of the patent test, see In Re Cardizem Antitrust Litigation 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006). 
25 Keith N. Hylton & Sungjoon Cho, Injunctive and Reverse Settlements in Competition-Blocking 
Litigation, 36 European J. Law Econ. 243 (2013). 
13 
 
the switch from the scope-of-patent test to the rule of reason kicks up a thick cloud of 
uncertainty.  Patent holders will be unable to predict the rule that courts might apply, 
especially given the difficulty of applying rule of reason analysis.  This uncertainty will 
increase the costs of patent infringement litigation.  Since patent infringement litigation is 
one of the costs of holding a patent, the switch to the rule of reason effectively reduces 
the value of patents, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, where many of the reverse 
payment settlements occur. 
 
The court’s analysis of the issues in Actavis reflects the view that every dollar of 
consumer surplus transferred to the patent holder, as a result of the patent right, reduces 
consumer surplus by the same amount.  This view misses the fact that up to the level of 
protection necessary to bring the innovation to market, there is no such dollar-for-dollar 
tradeoff.  The patent is what brings the market in the product into existence.  In the 
absence of the patent, there is no market in the product, and no consumer surplus. This is 
the reason why the need to maintain incentives to innovate sets a limit on the extent to 
which consumer harm can be internalized under the dynamic enforcement model 
explored in the previous part of this paper. 
 
The fallacy reflected in the reasoning of the Actavis majority is the notion that because 
rents from innovation and the surplus to consumers both come from the same fixed lump 
of potential consumer surplus (W+T+D in Figure 1), enhancing protection to the rents 
from innovation necessarily implies a reduction in value to consumers.  But there is no 
lump of surplus to distribute to consumers if firms do not innovate.  The protection of 
incentives to innovate should therefore be given a higher priority than the enhancement 
of the share of the innovation surplus going to consumers.  A legal rule, such as that 
announced in Actavis, that aims to enhance the share of innovation surplus going to 
consumers at the expense of reducing innovation incentives is likely to reduce both 
consumer surplus and innovation incentives in the long run. 
 
On a broader level, Actavis calls for an accommodation of patent and antitrust policies in 
areas where the scope of either area of law may be contested.  In this paper’s framework, 
however, the same economic issues are at stake, whether one refers to an issue as one of 
patent policy or one of antitrust policy.  Within a framework that addresses those issues 
squarely, a consistent set of policies emerge.  Under such a set of policies, there would be 
no point in treating antitrust and patent policies as in conflict with one another. 
 
There are other recent examples in which courts and enforcement authorities, like the 
Supreme Court in Actavis, have treated the tradeoff between innovation rents and 
consumer surplus as having a zero sum.  The Federal Trade Commission and the 
European Commission have both expressed the view that antitrust law constrains the 
enforcement of patents, especially standard essential patents, through injunctions.26  
Standard essential patents are often accompanied by a commitment to license on “fair, 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Neal R. Stoll and Shepard Goldfein, Setting the Standard for Product Innovation, NYLJ, vol. 
249, No. 28 (Feb. 11, 2013), available at http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/pub-
lications/Setting_the_Standard_For_Product_Innovation.pdf; Melissa Lipman, EU Antitrust Unit May 
Fight More Cos. On Standard Patents, Law360 (Jan. 30, 2013).  
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reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms” (FRAND).  It appears to be the policy of both 
the FTC and the EU that any effort to enforce a standard essential patent through the use 
of an injunction may be an antitrust violation, especially if the patent is encumbered with 
a FRAND commitment. 
 
The insertion of antitrust law into the patent enforcement process is a questionable 
expansion of the writ of antitrust enforcement agencies.27  The decision to enforce a 
patent through seeking an injunction has historically been a matter of patent law.  If the 
patent is judged invalid, the holder loses his infringement suit.  The FRAND commitment 
lays on top of this procedure a contractual obligation.  A firm sued for infringement has 
the option of bringing a contract breach claim against the patent holder when he has 
violated the FRAND commitment.28  Inserting antitrust law into this process adds a layer 
of additional legal complexity, untethered to the policies of patent law and contract law. 
To the extent antitrust provides anything novel here, it is as a source of rules that might 
support a decision that is inconsistent with either patent law or contract law – that is, 
either taking property granted under patent law or finding contractual obligations where 
contract law would not.  This observation alone does not imply that the application of 
antitrust law in this setting is socially undesirable.  However, it does suggest that the 
application carries a cost, in terms of uncertainty, that could distort innovation incentives 
unless cabined or constrained within relatively clear lines. 
 
The U.S. enforcement authorities and the European Commission adopt the view that a 
FRAND commitment is equivalent to a waiver of the right to seek an injunction.29  This 
is an example of a phantom contractual obligation, created by antitrust law, that is not an 
implication of either contract law or patent law.  Sure, a commitment to license on 
FRAND terms is a contractual commitment to negotiate on such terms before seeking an 
injunction.  But if the potential licensee demands terms that are more favorable to itself 
than the FRAND commitment implies (e.g., a license fee of zero), then the threat to seek 
an injunction is simply one of the weapons in the arsenal of the patent holder, as an 
owner of property.   
 
The Federal Trade Commission may view it as routine, now, to require holders of 
standard essential patents to agree not to enforce the patents through an injunction when 
they seek agency approval of a proposed merger.30  The firms that have agreed to such 
terms have done so in order to complete a proposed merger, so they presumably have 
concluded that the merger is more valuable than the right to enforce their patents through 
injunction threats.  The question, though, is whether the FTC’s policy of disarmament is 
socially desirable.  To the extent that it reduces the value of patents, and, in turn, the 
                                                 
27 See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Whither Symmetry?  Antitrust Analysis of Intellectual 
Property Rights at the FTC and DOJ, 9 Competition Policy International 41 (2013). 
28 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (finding that the 
FRAND commitment creates an enforceable promise to a third-party beneficiary).  See generally, Thomas 
Cotter, The Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties, 
forthcoming in the Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal; William H. Page, Judging Monopolistic 
Pricing: F/RAND and Antitrust Injury, forthcoming in the Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal. 
29 Sharis Pozen, Antitrust Agencies Will Remain Focused On Patent Conduct, Law360 (Feb. 4, 2013).  
30 Donald Martin, SEP Antitrust Analysis – More Complex Than It Seems, Law360 (Dec. 19, 2012). 
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reward from innovation, it is unlikely to be socially desirable.  There is, in addition, the 
question whether the FTC should be permitted, as a matter of policy and of constitutional 
law, to condition the right to merge on the forfeiture of the right to defend a specific type 
of property. 
 
Antitrust, in the view of the enforcement agencies, focuses primarily on the enhancement 
of short-run consumer surplus.  The dynamic effect, or innovation tradeoff, is not part of 
the agencies’ analysis.  The intervention of antitrust policy would be acceptable if it took 
into consideration the same concerns as patent law.  Its failure to do so may harm 
consumers in the long run, by discouraging innovation.  At the least, some effort should 
be made in the enforcement process to balance innovation effects with consumer welfare 
effects. 
 
I have only scratched the surface of the many ways in which antitrust under the static 
enforcement framework conflicts with innovation incentives.  The areas of conflict are so 
numerous that a suitably funded enforcement agency could supplant the work of the 
patent courts.  For example, suppose a firm lawfully acquires a patent.  What prevents the 
FTC from suing the firm on the ground that its patent was based on something the agency 
views as a trivial technological innovation and that the primary effect of the patent is to 
extract welfare from consumers in violation of the antitrust laws?  I am not aware of such 
a bold assertion by an enforcement agency before,31 but it seems to be the logical 
endpoint of current enforcement policy. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Competition and innovation policies are equally implicated in many cases, especially 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  The Chicago School analysis, largely of the 70s and 
80s, advanced antitrust policy by making efficiency an important matter of concern in 
antitrust enforcement.  The antitrust revolution that remains to occur is a movement 
toward a policy that takes innovation incentives seriously.  The enforcement agencies 
appear to be moving in the opposite direction, displacing innovation policies of the 
intellectual property laws with antitrust policies aimed at increasing the share of 
innovation surplus going to consumers.  
 
Franklin famously said that those “who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little 
temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”  Similarly, an antitrust policy of 
sacrificing innovation incentives to redistribute more innovation surplus to consumers is 
likely to reduce consumer welfare in the long run.  
 
 
                                                 
31 In Walker Process Equipment v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), the Court 
held that antitrust law applies when a firm uses a fraudulently obtained patent to exclude rivals.  There is 
nothing in the framework of this paper that suggests that the fraudulent use of intellectual property 
protection (e.g., patent or trademark protection) should never be treated as an antitrust violation.  The 
example I offer in the text here is an enforcement action in response to lawfully acquired intellectual 
property protection. 
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